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Abstract
We investigate newsvendor games whose payoff function is uncertain due to ambiguity in demand
distributions. We discuss the concept of stability under uncertainty and introduce solution concepts
for robust cooperative games which could be applied to these newsvendor games. Properties and
numerical schemes for finding core solutions of robust newsvendor games are presented.
Keywords: Cooperative games; uncertain payoffs; newsvendor games; robust optimization; stability.
1 Introduction
A joint venture is usually an effective approach for individual players in the market to share costs,
reduce risk, and increase the total joint revenue or profit. For example, individual retailers can decide
whether to order inventories together and share the profit from selling ordered products later. As a
part of the joint venture formation, all players should agree on how to share the joint profit or payoff
before the cooperation is established. Cooperative game theory provides a mathematical framework for
addressing this problem, which is modeled as newsvendor centralization games (or newsvendor games
for short). The model of these games has been introduced in Hartman [16]. Formally, consider the
set N of N retailers and let d˜i ∈ R+ be the random demand for retailer i, i ∈ N . In the setting of
newsvendor games, we assume that the unit ordering cost c and the unit selling price p are the same
for all retailers, 0 < c < p. Given an ordering quantity y, the expected profit (or payoff) of retailer i is
vi(y) = EPi
[
pmin{d˜i, y} − cy
]
, i ∈ N . (1)
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Individual retailer i needs to decide the optimal ordering quantity y∗i to maximize the expected profit
(or payoff), y∗i ∈ arg max
y≥0
vi(y), which is the (p− c)/p-quantile of Pi, the distribution function of d˜i for
all i ∈ N . The optimal expected profit is v¯i = vi(y∗i ) = EPi
[
pmin{d˜i, y∗i } − cy∗i
]
.
In the newsvendor games, we are concerned about whether individual retailers should form a coalition
to make orders together and share the inventories with each other. For a coalition S ⊆ N , the aggregate
demand is d˜(S) =
∑
i∈S
d˜i and we assume that the joint distribution P (S) of d˜i, i ∈ S, is known. Given
an ordering quantity y, the total expected profit of coalition S is
v(y,S) = EP (S)
[
pmin{d˜(S), y} − cy
]
. (2)
Similarly, coalition S of retailers needs to decide the optimal ordering quantity y∗(S) to maximize the
total expected profit,
y∗(S) ∈ arg max
y≥0
v(y,S), (3)
which again is the (p − c)/p-quantile of the distribution of d˜(S). The optimal total expected profit of
coalition S is
v¯(S) = v(y∗(S),S) = EP (S)
[
pmin{d˜(S), y∗(S)} − cy∗(S)
]
. (4)
In order to guarantee that all retailers are satisfied with the grand coalition N , there should be an
allocation (also called payoff distribution) of the total expected profit v¯(N ) among retailers such that
no group of retailers has the incentive to form a smaller but better coalition. Newsvendor games concern
about the existence of these stable payoff distributions.
Traditionally, the underlying assumption in newsvendor games is that the joint demand distribution
is known with certainty. Under this assumption, the expected profits v¯(S) are known for all S ⊆ N . In
reality, it can be sometimes difficult to justify this assumption, especially when retailers need to decide
whether to cooperate with each other before observing and sharing records of joint demands. If the joint
demand distribution is unknown, the expected profits v¯(S) are uncertain. Under the assumption that
these payoffs are random variables, several models of stochastic cooperative games have been studied
in order to address the uncertainty in coalition payoffs . Charnes and Granot [7] propose a two-stage
payoff distribution scheme. In the first stage, some amounts of individual payoffs, which are called
prior-payoffs, are promised to the players in the coalition. In the second stage, once the coalition payoff
is realized, there could be adjustments in individual payoffs to guarantee that the payoff distribution is
feasible and that any objections among the players are minimized. This approach assumes risk-neutral
behaviors among players. Suijs et al. [26] study a different payoff distribution scheme for stochastic
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cooperative games using preference orders for random payoffs, which can handle different types of risk
behavior. An individual payoff under this distribution scheme consists of two parts. The first part
is a monetary exchange between players and the second part is a fraction of the random coalition
payoff, which can depend on the action taken by the coalition. This distribution scheme works well for
some applications such as the insurance game discussed in Suijs et al. [25]. More recently, Uhan [29]
generalizes this payoff distribution scheme for stochastic linear programming games with applications in
inventory centralization and network fortification. Timmer et al. [27] argue that risk-covering monetary
compensation is not needed in other applications. It is indeed a reasonable assumption that players
(e.g., retailers or firms) in the examples discussed therein do not feel the need to pay upfront in order to
benefit from a greater share of the profit in the future. Timmer et al. [27] then propose a similar payoff
distribution scheme for stochastic cooperative games without monetary exchange in which a multiple
of the random coalition payoff is allocated to each individual. Ferna´ndez et al. [14] also consider this
payoff distribution scheme as a special case while investigating general stochastic payoff distributions
using stochastic orders for stochastic cooperative games.
In addition to these models of stochastic cooperative games, there are different models that address
different aspects of cooperative games under uncertainty. Lehrer [19] investigates payoff distribution
processes in repeated deterministic cooperative games. The payoff allocation at any time depends on
past allocations and current coalition payoffs. Lehrer [19] shows that these payoff distribution processes
converge to some well-known solutions of cooperative games under appropriate allocation rules. Dror et
al. [10] extend these allocation rules and payoff distribution processes for repeated stochastic cooperative
games and apply them to dynamic newsvendor realization games. Bauso and Timmer [1], on the other
hand, study dynamic cooperative games under the setting of a family of games whose coalition values
are uncertain. Toriello and Uhan [28] investigate the dynamic linear programming games with risk-
averse players. The study of cooperative games with incomplete information addresses other aspects
of uncertainty in cooperative games. Ieong and Shoham [18] develop solution concepts of Bayesian
cooperative games such as ex ante, ex interim, and ex post cores under the assumption that all players
have a common prior over the set of possible states of the world but that each of them has some private
information or belief about the true state of the world. More recently, Li and Conitzer [20] focus
on solution concepts that maximize the probability of ex post stability assuming all players know the
distribution of the random state of the world. Clearly, in this setting, private information of players
does not play an important role since only ex post stability is considered. Chalkiadadis and Boutilier
[6] study Bayesian coalition formation problems when players have different beliefs about contributions
3
of other players to coalition payoffs, which makes coalition payoffs uncertain. Forges and Serrano [15]
discuss different models of cooperative games with incomplete information that handle externality; i.e.,
the effects of actions and information of players outside a coalition on the coalition payoff and payoffs
of individual players in the coalition.
In this paper, we focus on newsvendor games with uncertain expected profits (or payoffs) under a
similar setting to those of stochastic cooperative games discussed above; that is, uncertainty is captured
and represented only in the payoff functions of the games. Our research, however, is different from
existing models of stochastic cooperative games given the fact it is difficult to obtain probabilistic
information on uncertain expected profits v¯(S), S ⊆ N . This assumption is particularly useful for
newsvendor games considered in this paper in which the uncertainty of the payoffs is modeled through
an uncertainty set derived from the ambiguity of the joint demand distribution.
Contributions and paper outline
In this paper, we focus on the newsvendor games with ambiguity in the joint demand distribution.
Specifically, our contributions and the structure of the paper are as follows:
(1) Section 3 develops a framework of cooperative games with uncertain payoffs which could be applied
to newsvendor games under distributional ambiguity. We call these games robust cooperative
games. Solution concepts such as imputation, core, and game balancedness of robust cooperative
games are defined and discussed.
(2) Section 4 studies newsvendor games with ambiguity in demand distributions using the framework
of robust cooperative games. We focus on the existence of rational and stable payoff distributions
of these robust newsvendor games. We also discuss the computational aspect of finding core
solutions for robust newsvendor games and provide some numerical results.
2 Deterministic Cooperative Games
Before presenting the model of cooperative games with uncertain payoffs that could be applied for
newsvendor games under distributional ambiguity, we introduce some solution concepts of deterministic
cooperative games whose payoffs are known with certainty. Consider a set of N players, N = {1, . . . , N},
and a function v : 2N → R, which is called the characteristic function, such that v(∅) = 0. We call
G = (N , v) a cooperative game. Utility (payoff) is assumed to be transferable, i.e., for any coalition
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S ⊆ N , its total payoff is completely defined as v(S), which can be transferred freely among its members.
Under the assumption that the joint demand distribution is known with certainty, the newsvendor games
previously introduced is indeed a deterministic cooperative game, G¯ = (N , v¯), where v¯ is defined as in
(4).
Given a cooperative game (N , v), we are interested in finding an allocation x ∈ RN to distribute
the total payoff v(N ) among individual players. An allocation (also called a payoff distribution) x is
efficient if ∑
i∈N
xi = v(N ). (5)
An important question regarding cooperative games is whether players are willing to join the grand
coalition N . Necessarily, there should be an allocation x ∈ RN with which each individual player is
better off as compared to his/her standalone payoff. An allocation x is called individually rational if
xi ≥ v({i}), ∀ i ∈ N . (6)
Definition 1. An imputation is an allocation that is both efficient and individually rational. The set
of imputations of a cooperative game (N , v) is written as follows:
impu(N , v) :=
{
x ∈ RN |
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N ), xi ≥ v({i}), ∀ i ∈ N
}
. (7)
If the characteristic function v is super-additive, i.e., for any two disjoint coalitions S1 and S2,
S1 ∩ S2 = ∅, v(S1) + v(S2) ≤ v(S1 ∪ S2), it is clear that there always exists at least one imputation or
impu(N , v) 6= ∅.
Individual rationality is not sufficient to guarantee that some players would prefer the grand coalition
N to a smaller coalition S ( N . An allocation is called stable with respect to a coalition S if
∑
i∈S
xi ≥
v(S).
Definition 2. The set of efficient allocations that are stable with respect to all coalitions S ⊆ N is
called the core,
core(N , v) :=
{
x ∈ RN |
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N ),
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S), ∀S ( N
}
. (8)
It is obvious that core(N , v) ⊆ impu(N , v). However, the core might not exist. There are different
solution concepts that take this issue into account. Given a parameter  ≥ 0, the -core is defined as
follows:
-core(N , v) :=
{
x ∈ RN |
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N ),
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S)− , ∀S ( N
}
. (9)
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It is clear that -core is non-empty for a given large enough . The least core is the non-empty -core
with the smallest value of , which is called the least core value. The least core value (N , v) is the
optimal value of the following linear program:
(N , v) = min
x,≥0

s.t.
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N ),∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S)− , ∀S ⊆ N .
(10)
If we are able to solve Problem (10) and obtain (N , v) = 0, then the core is non-empty. Schulz and
Uhan [24] consider Problem (10) in a slightly different way:
s(N , v) = min
x,

s.t.
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N ),∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S)− , ∀S ( N ,S 6= ∅.
(11)
In general, we have (N , v) = max{s(N , v), 0}, i.e., s(N , v) coincides with the least core value if it is
non-negative. If s(N , v) < 0, the absolute value |s(N , v)| can be interpreted as the maximum possible
increase in all coalition payoffs v(S), S ( N , under the condition that at least one efficient and stable
allocation still exists.
For the newsvendor game (N , v¯), the characteristic function v¯ is super-additive. Indeed, we have
v¯(S) = EP (S)
[
pmin{d˜i, y∗(S)} − cy∗(S)
]
= (p− c)y∗(S)− pEP (S)
[(
y∗(S)− d˜(S)
)+]
,
where x+ = max{x, 0}. Consider two disjoint coalitions S1 and S2, S1 ∩ S2 = ∅; we have d˜(S1 ∪ S2) =
d˜(S1) + d˜(S2). Using (3) and the fact that (x+ y)+ ≤ x+ + y+, we have
v¯(S1 ∪ S2) ≥ (p− c)(y∗(S1) + y∗(S2))− pEP (S1∪S2)
[(
y∗(S1) + y∗(S2)− d˜(S1 ∪ S2)
)+]
≥ (p− c)y∗(S1)− pEP (S1)
[(
y∗(S1)− d˜(S1)
)+]
+
(p− c)y∗(S2)− pEP (S2)
[(
y∗(S2)− d˜(S2)
)+]
= v¯(S1) + v¯(S2).
This shows that newsvendor games always have imputations. For normally distributed demands, Hart-
man et al. [17] show that the cores of these games are non-empty. Chen and Zhang [8] use stochastic
linear programming duality to show the non-emptiness of the core in inventory centralization games
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and to provide a computational method for finding one. Mu¨ller et al. [22] prove that every newsvendor
game has a non-empty core, i.e., for all possible distributions of random demands. Montrucchio and
Scarsini [21] show how to construct an allocation in the core of newsvendor games. In the next section,
we develop a model of cooperative games with uncertain characteristic functions that could be used to
study newsvendor games with the ambiguity in demand distributions.
3 Robust Cooperative Games
When the payoffs are uncertain and assumed to be random variables (with finite expectation), the model
of stochastic cooperative games proposed by Suijs et al. [26] can be applied. Suijs et al. [26] define a
stochastic cooperative game as a tuple (N ,A, v˜,%), where N is the set of players, A(S) is the set of
possible actions that coalition S, S ⊆ N , can take. v˜(a,S) is the random payoff obtained by coalition
S if action a ∈ A(S) is taken. The inclusion of action sets A(S) in this model of stochastic cooperative
games reflects the fact that players can take different actions when facing uncertainty, which is different
in the setting of deterministic cooperative games in which everything, including actions of players, is
known with certainty. For newsvendor games, if retailers in a coalition S do not know their joint demand
distribution, there is no ordering quantity to achieve the “optimal” expected profit and they can choose
to pick an ordering quantity y from a set of possible ordering quantities Y(S). Clearly, the expected
profit of a coalition S, v˜(y,S), now depends on the ordering quantity y. Finally, %i describes the
preference of player i, i ∈ N , over different random variables. For two random payoff v˜ and v˜′, v˜ %i v˜′
means that player i prefers v˜ over v˜′. This order relation of stochastic payoffs is needed for this model
of stochastic cooperative games to replace the straightforward comparison among deterministic payoffs
in the deterministic setting. Suijs et al. [26] discuss several preference relations such as quantile-based
relations and stochastic dominance for which the existence of core allocations is studied in detail.
For newsvendor games, the assumption of a known joint demand distribution in the deterministic
setting can be considered to be rather strong given the fact that individual retailers usually collect
historical demands independently before they join any coalition. In order to make the problem more
realistic, we can assume that some (multivariate) marginal distributions are known instead of the joint
distribution. For example, it is more reasonable to assume the knowledge of the joint demand distri-
bution of a subset of retailers that are located close to each other and hence likely to serve customers
from the same area. Under this assumption of distributional ambiguity, the joint demand distribution
is unknown and belongs to an ambiguity set. For a coalition S, given an ordering quantity y, the total
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expected profit v˜(y,S) = EP˜ (S)
[
pmin{d˜i, y} − cy(S)
]
is uncertain and belongs to an uncertainty set if
the (marginal) distribution P˜ (S) is not known with certainty. In general, the characteristic function
v˜ of newsvendor games is uncertain if there is ambiguity in demand distributions. In order to apply
the model of stochastic cooperative games discussed above for these newsvendor games, we would need
to assume that probability distributions of random payoffs v˜(y,S) are known. However, it is difficult
to impose this probabilistic assumption, given that the randomness of v˜(y,S) comes from the uncer-
tainty of the probability distribution P˜ (S). In order to address this issue, we propose a new model of
general cooperative games with uncertain characteristic functions, which is different from the model of
stochastic cooperative games proposed by Suijs et al. [26].
Given a coalition S ⊆ N and an action a ∈ A(S), instead of considering v˜(a,S) as a random variable,
we consider it as an uncertain payoff vu(a,S), where u ∈ U and U is an uncertainty set. Let us denote
VU (a,S) = {vu(a,S) : u ∈ U} for S ⊆ N and a ∈ A(S). We also denote V(U) = {vu : A×2N → R, u ∈
U} as the set of all characteristic functions. This setting is appropriate for the newsvendor games with
the ambiguity in demand distribution in which the joint demand distribution P belongs to an ambiguity
set P. We define an instance of cooperative games with uncertain characteristic functions by the tuple
(N ,A,V(U)). In order to define the main concepts of these cooperative games (N ,A,V(U)), we need
first to select a payoff distribution scheme and characterize when sub-coalitions would break away from
the grand coalition.
There are many different ways how payoffs can be allocated under uncertainty. When payoffs are
assumed to be random variables, the most general payoff distribution scheme with random allocation
for stochastic cooperative games is studied by Ferna´ndez et al. [14]. For a coalition S, they consider
efficient allocations as random vectors x˜ that satisfy
∑
i∈S
x˜i = v˜(a,S), (12)
assuming a ∈ A(S) is the chosen action for the coalition. Suijs et al. [26] argue that this general stochas-
tic payoff distribution scheme generates a very large class of allocations and results in computational
difficulties. They propose a more restrictive payoff distribution scheme that can be represented by a
pair (d, r) ∈ R|S|×R|S| such that
∑
i∈S
di = E [v˜(a,S)] and
∑
i∈S
ri = 1, ri ≥ 0 for all i ∈ S. The stochastic
allocation is defined as x˜i = di + ri (v˜(a,S)− E [v˜(a,S)]) for all i ∈ S. Note that this allocation scheme
require probabilistic information, i.e., expectations of random characteristic functions. When the char-
acteristic functions are deterministic, this allocation scheme coincides with the classical allocation of
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deterministic cooperative games, xi = di for all i ∈ S, where
∑
i∈S
di = E [v˜(a,S)] = v(S). Timmer et al.
[27] propose another payoff distribution scheme that is represented by a vector z ∈ RS of multiples. The
stochastic allocation under this scheme is x˜i = v˜(a,S)·zi for all i ∈ S. Here, it is not required for zi to be
non-negative for i ∈ S. In order to guarantee that the stochastic allocation is efficient, it is required that∑
i∈S
zi = 1. Compared to the payoff distribution scheme in Suijs et al. [26], Timmer et al. [27] argue that
their proposed scheme does not allow monetary compensations to cover risk, which can be considered
as a reasonable setting for several applications such as newsvendor games discussed above. Note that
this scheme can also be seen as a direct extension of that of deterministic cooperative games since any
allocation of deterministic cooperative games can be written in terms of multiples of v(S), assuming
v(S) 6= 0. For the proposed model of cooperative games with uncertain characteristic functions, we face
the same issues when defining payoff distribution schemes due to the uncertainty of the characteristic
functions. Instead of having a random payoff x˜i as in stochastic cooperative games, the uncertain payoff
of player i is now represented by the set Xi(U) = {xi(u) : u ∈ U} ⊂ R. For a coalition S, we obtain
the set of payoff vectors X S(U) = {xS(u) : u ∈ U} ⊂ R|S|, where xS(u) = {xi(u) : i ∈ S}. Given that
our main application is the newsvendor game in which risk-covering monetary compensation is not very
important, we adopt a similar payoff distribution scheme to the one proposed by Timmer et al. [27] for
our model of cooperative games with uncertain characteristic functions. Formally, for a coalition S, a
payoff distribution scheme is represented by z ∈ R|S| such that for a given action a ∈ S, the uncertain
allocation for each player i, i ∈ S is
xi(u) = vu(a,S) · zi, ∀u ∈ U . (13)
A payoff distribution scheme z is efficient if
∑
i∈S
zi = 1. This concept of efficiency indicates that the
uncertain allocation x is efficient for all realizations of the uncertain characteristic function vu ∈ V(U).
Now, similar to stochastic cooperative games, the concepts of rationality and stability rely on both
the payoff distribution scheme and the action taken by the grand coalition, the decision (a, z). They also
depend on how we characterize the preference of individuals and sub-coalitions with respect to staying
in or breaking away from the grand coalition. In the model of stochastic cooperative games proposed
by Suijs et al. [26], order relations of stochastic payoffs are used to define these stay-in/break-away
preferences. Under the setting of uncertain payoffs, there is no distributional information and we need
to define these preferences based on the realization of uncertain parameters. The resulting uncertain
allocation for each player i, i ∈ N is xi(u) = vu(a,N ) · zi, u ∈ U for all i ∈ N . If he/she acts alone with
9
the action α ∈ A({i}), the uncertain payoff is vu(α, {i}). If he/she joins a smaller sub-coalition S ( N
whose decision is (aˆ, zˆ), the uncertain allocation would be vu(aˆ,S) · zˆi. Given a realization of u ∈ U ,
each player i can compare these different realized payoffs directly and the sub-coalition would have the
incentive to break away if all of its members are better off as in the deterministic setting. By looking at
the break away incentive given a realization of uncertain parameters, we can define stay-in/break-away
preferences of sub-coalitions (and individual players) under the uncertain setting as follows.
Definition 3. A sub-coalition S has the incentive to break away from the grand coalition if there exists
a decision (aˆ, zˆ) which guarantees that all players in the sub-coalition are better off by leaving given at
least one realization u ∈ U , i.e., vu(aˆ,S) · zˆi > xi(u) for all i ∈ S.
In other words, a sub-coalition has the incentive to stay in the grand coalition if no matter what
decision it takes, there will be at least one player in the sub-coalition is better off by staying in the grand
coalition in any realization of uncertain parameters. Applying this definition for individual players, we
can say that a player has the incentive to break away if there exists an action α ∈ A({i}) which
guarantees that he/she will be better off by leaving the grand coalition for at least one realization of
u ∈ U , i.e., vu(α, {i}) > xi(u). Note that the idea of defining these realization-based concepts is similar
to those in Bitran [4], which are used to define necessary and sufficient solution concepts for multi-
objective optimization. We are now ready to define main solution concepts for cooperative games with
uncertain characteristic functions (N ,A,V(U)) using the proposed payoff distribution scheme and the
above definition of break away incentive.
A decision (a, z) is individually rational if there is no individual player who has the incentive to
break away. We can then define the concept of imputations.
Definition 4. An imputation of the cooperative game (N ,A,V(U)) is an individually rational decision
(a, z) whose payoff distribution scheme z is efficient.
Similar to the deterministic setting, let impu(N ,A,V(U)) denote the set of all imputations of the
cooperative game (N ,A,V(U)).
We now define the concept of stability. A decision (a, z) is stable if there is no sub-coalition S ( N
that has the incentive to break away and we have the following definition of the cores of cooperative
games (N ,A,V(U)).
Definition 5. The core of the cooperative game (N ,A,V(U)) is the set of all stable decisions with
efficient payoff distribution schemes and is denoted by core(N ,A,V(U)).
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The above definition of stability indicates that all sub-coalitions of a stable grand coalition necessarily
do not have the incentive to break away no matter how u ∈ U is realized. This follows the “immunized-
against-uncertainty” principle of robust optimization (see Ben-Tal et al. [2] and references therein);
therefore, we call cooperative games (N ,A,V(U)) with the above definition of break away incentive
robust cooperative games.
We are now ready to characterize the existence of imputations and core decisions, i.e., decisions
belong to the core, of robust cooperative games (N ,A,V(U)). We start by making the following as-
sumptions.
Assumption 1.
(i) For any player i ∈ N , there exists an action such that his/her payoff is always non-negative, i.e.,
there exists a ∈ A({i}) such that vu(a, {i}) ≥ 0 for all u ∈ U .
(ii) The payoff of the grand coalition N is always positive, i.e., vu(a,N ) > 0 for all a ∈ A(N ) and
u ∈ U .
Similar to Timmer et al. [27], these assumptions emphasize the fact that we are focusing on profit
games with possible nonnegative payoff for each individual sub-coalition and it is indeed worth con-
sidering the grand coalition given that its profit is always positive. In other words, Assumption 1(ii)
implies that we should only consider the set of actions A(N ) which create positive profits under any
circumstances for the grand coalition. For robust newsvendor games that we are going to discuss in
Section 4, these assumptions are easily satisfied in general.
We now state the following result on existence conditions for imputations of robust cooperative
games.
Theorem 1. Given a robust cooperative game (N ,A,V(U)), an imputation exists if and only if there
exists an action a ∈ A(N ) such that ∑
i∈N
vmax(a, {i}) ≤ 1, (14)
where vmax(a, {i}) = max
u∈U

max
αi∈A({i})
vu(αi, {i})
vu(a,N )
.
In order to prove the theorem, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Given a robust cooperative game (N ,A,V(U)) and a decision (a, z), a player i ∈ N has no
incentive to break away if and only if zi ≥ vmax(a, {i}).
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Proof. We have: xi(u) = vu(a,N ) · zi for all i ∈ N and u ∈ U . Player i ∈ N does not have the
incentive to break away if and only if
vu(αi, {i}) ≤ vu(a,N ) · zi, ∀αi ∈ A({i}), u ∈ U .
Under Assumption 1(ii), this holds if and only if zi ≥ max
αi∈A({i})
vu(αi, {i})
vu(a,N ) for all u ∈ U , i.e.,
zi ≥ max
u∈U

max
αi∈A({i})
vu(αi, {i})
vu(a,N )
 = vmax(a, {i}).

We are now ready to prove Theorem 1.
Proof. Suppose an imputation (a, z) exists. According to the definition of imputations, there is no
player i ∈ N who has the incentive to break away. Thus, according to Lemma 1, we have:
zi ≥ vmax(a, {i}), ∀ i ∈ N .
Now, (a, z) is a decision of the grand coalition; therefore,
∑
i∈N
zi = 1. Summing over all i ∈ N the above
inequality, we then achieve condition (14).
Now, suppose condition (14) holds. Let  = 1−
∑
i∈N
vmax(a, {i}) ≥ 0 and define
zi = vmax(a, {i}) + 
N
, ∀ i ∈ N .
We will show that (a, z) is an imputation. Clearly, z is efficient, i.e.,
∑
i∈N
zi = 1 given the definition of
zi and . Now we have: for all u ∈ U , zi ≥ vmax(a, {i}) ≥
max
αi∈A({i})
vu(αi, {i})
vu(a,N ) for all i ∈ N since  ≥ 0.
Thus, under Assumption 1(ii),
vu(a,N ) · zi ≥ max
αi∈A({i})
vu(αi, {i}), ∀ i ∈ N , u ∈ U .
It shows that for all u ∈ U ,
xi(u) ≥ vu(αi, {i}), ∀ i ∈ N , αi ∈ A({i}).
Thus, there is no player i who has the incentive to break away; that is (a, z) is individually rational,
which implies that (a, z) is an imputation. 
Similar to the deterministic and stochastic cooperative games, the existence of core decisions is
related to the concept of balancedness. A map µ : 2N \ ∅ → [0,+∞) is called a balanced map if
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∑
S(N
µ(S) ·eS = eN , where, for all S ⊆ N , eS ∈ {0, 1}N with (eS)i = 1 if and only if i ∈ S. We are now
ready to define the balanced robust cooperative game.
Definition 6. A robust cooperative game (N ,A,V(U)) is called balanced if there exists an action a ∈
A(N ) such that for all balanced map µ,
∑
S(N
µ(S)vmax(a,S) ≤ 1, (15)
where vmax(a,S) = max
u∈U

max
αS∈A(S)
vu(αS ,S)
vu(a,N )
.
This definition of balanced robust cooperative games matches the definition of balanced deterministic
games when |U| = |A(S)| = 1 for all S ⊆ N with the balancedness condition
∑
S(N
µ(S)v(S) ≤ v(N ).
We can now state the following theorem regarding the existence of core decisions.
Theorem 2. A robust cooperative game (N ,A,V(U)) has a non-empty core if and only if it is balanced.
In order to prove Theorem 2, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Given a robust cooperative game (N ,A,V(U)) and an imputation (a, z), a coalition S ( N
has the incentive to break away if and only if
∑
i∈S
zi < vmax(a,S). (16)
Proof. Given an imputation (a, z), a coalition S has the incentive to break away if there exists an
efficient decision (aˆ, zˆ) and a realization u ∈ U such that for all i ∈ S,
vu(aˆ,S) · zˆi > vu(a,N ) · zi.
Since (aˆ, zˆ) is efficient, we have:
∑
i∈S
zˆi = 1. Summing over all i ∈ S the inequality above, we then
obtain the following statement:
∃u ∈ U : vu(a,N ) ·
∑
i∈S
zi < vu(aˆ,S) ·
∑
i∈S
zˆi = vu(aˆ,S).
Equivalently, under Assumption 1(ii), we have:
∃u ∈ U :
∑
i∈S
zi <
vu(aˆ,S)
vu(a,N ) ⇔
∑
i∈S
zi < max
u∈U
{
vu(aˆ,S)
vu(a,N )
}
.
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We have:
max
u∈U
{
vu(aˆ,S)
vu(a,N )
}
≤ max
αS∈A(S)
max
u∈U
{
vu(αS ,S)
vu(a,N )
}
= max
u∈U
max
αS∈A(S)
{
vu(αS ,S)
vu(a,N )
}
= max
u∈U

max
αS∈A(S)
vu(αS ,S)
vu(a,N )
 .
The second equality is due to the fact that vu(a,N ) > 0 for all u ∈ U under Assumption 1(ii). Thus, if
a coalition S has the incentive to break away, then
∑
i∈S
zi < max
u∈U

max
αS∈A(S)
vu(αS ,S)
vu(a,N )
 = vmax(a,S).
Now, suppose
∑
i∈S
zi < vmax(a,S), we will show that coalition S has the incentive to break away.
We would need to show the existence of an efficient decision (aˆ, zˆ) and a realization u ∈ U such that
for all i ∈ S,
vu(aˆ,S) · zˆi > vu(a,N ) · zi.
Let (aˆ, uˆ) ∈ arg max
αS∈A(S)
max
u∈U
{
vu(αS ,S)
vu(a,N )
}
. Clearly, we have:
vuˆ(aˆ,S)
vuˆ(a,N ) = maxαS∈A(S)maxu∈U
{
vu(αS ,S)
vu(a,N )
}
= max
u∈U

max
αS∈A(S)
vu(αS ,S)
vu(a,N )
 = vmax(a,S).
From Lemma 1, we have zi ≥ vmax(a, {i}) since (a, z) is an imputation. We also have, by Assump-
tion 1(i), vmax(a, {i}) ≥ 0. Thus, vmax(a,S) >
∑
i∈S
zi ≥ 0 and hence vuˆ(aˆ,S) 6= 0.
Let  =
1
|S|
(
vmax(a,S)−
∑
i∈S
zi
)
> 0 and define zˆi =
zi + 
vmax(a,S) for all i ∈ S. Clearly,
∑
i∈S
zˆi = 1
given the definition of . In addition, for all i ∈ S, we have:
vuˆ(aˆ,S) · zˆi = vuˆ(a,N ) · zi + vuˆ(a,N ) ·  > vuˆ(a,N ) · zi.
Thus, (aˆ, zˆ) is an efficient decision and the inequality above shows that coalition S indeed has the
incentive to break away. 
We are now ready to prove Theorem 2.
Proof. Suppose there exists a core decision (a, z). Clearly, (a, z) is an imputation. Applying Lemma
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2, we can show that z is a feasible (and optimal) solution of the following linear program:
ZP = min
x
∑
i∈N
0 · xi
s.t.
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ vmax(a,S), ∀S ( N ,∑
i∈N
xi = 1.
(17)
The dual problem is written as follows:
ZD = max
∑
S(N
ySvmax(a,S)− p
s.t.
∑
S:i∈S
yS − p = 0, ∀ i ∈ N ,
yS ≥ 0, ∀S ( N .
(18)
Applying strong duality, we have: ZD = ZP = 0, which means, for all feasible solution
({yS}S(N , p),∑
S(N
ySvmax(a,S) ≤ p.
Now consider any balanced map µ, it is clear that
({µ(S)}S(N , 1) is a feasible solution of the dual
problem. Thus we have: ∑
S(N
µ(S)vmax(a,S) ≤ 1.
It shows that the robust cooperative game is balanced.
Now, suppose the robust cooperative game is balanced. There exists an action a ∈ A(N ) such that
for all balanced map µ, ∑
S(N
µ(S)vmax(a,S) ≤ 1.
We are going to show that ZD = 0. The dual problem is indeed feasible. (0, 0) is a feasible solution and
it implies that ZD ≥ 0. Let us consider a feasible solution
({yS}S(N , p). Since yS ≥ 0 for all S ( N ,
we have: p ≥ 0. If p = 0, it is easy to show that yS = 0 for all S ( N . If p > 0, let µ(S) = yS/p for all
S ( N . The map µ is indeed a balanced map, thus we have:∑
S(N
(yS/p) vmax(a,S) ≤ 1 ⇔
∑
S(N
ySvmax(a,S)− p ≤ 0.
Thus for all feasible solution
({yS}S(N , p), ∑
S(N
ySvmax(a,S)− p ≤ 0, which means ZD ≤ 0 and hence
ZD = 0. According linear strong duality, the primal problem is feasible (and with the obvious optimal
objective ZP = 0). Thus there exists at least a feasible solution z of the primal problem. The decision
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(a, z) is an imputation and indeed a core decision given the conditions obtained from the constraints of
the primal problem. Thus the robust cooperative game has a non-empty core. 
Theorem (2) establishes the relationship between the game balancedness and the existence of core
solutions. Computationally, it implies that we can attempt to solve the following optimization problem
to check the existence of core solutions:
s(N ,A,V(U)) = min
x,,a

s.t.
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ vmax(a,S)− , ∀S ( N ,∑
i∈N
xi = 1,
a ∈ A(N ).
(19)
If s(N ,A,V(U)) ≤ 0, then the core of the robust cooperative game (N ,A,V(U)) is non-empty. Note that
this optimization problem is no longer a linear program like Problem (10) or (11) given the fact that the
action of the grand coalition is now a decision variable. We will investigate further the computational
aspect of finding a core solution for a specific robust cooperative game, the robust newsvendor game,
which is going to be discussed next. Even though the framework of robust cooperative games developed
in this section is indeed suitable for the newsvendor games with distributional ambiguity which we are
interested in, we would like to emphasize that it is plausible to develop other frameworks of cooperative
games with uncertain characteristic functions using different payoff distribution schemes and different
preference relations to suit other applications better.
4 Robust Newsvendor Games
In this section, we consider newsvendor games with ambiguity in demand distributions in the framework
of robust cooperative games, which we call robust newsvendor games. As discussed in the previous
section, the uncertainty comes from the fact that the joint demand distribution is unknown. We assume
that only some (multivariate) marginal distributions of the joint demand are known. More concretely,
consider a partition of N with R subsets N1, . . . ,NR such that
N =
R⋃
r=1
Nr and Nr ∩Ns = ∅ for all r 6= s.
Given a vector d ∈ Rn, let dr ∈ RNr denote the sub-vector formed with the elements in the rth subset
Nr where Nr = |Nr| is the size of the subset. We assume that probability measures Pr of random vectors
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d˜r are known for all r = 1, . . . , R. Let P(P1, . . . , PR) denote the set of joint probability measures of the
random vector d˜ consistent with the prescribed probability measures of the random vectors d˜r for all
r = 1, . . . , R, which acts as the uncertainty set U in the general framework of robust cooperative games.
Note that P(P1, . . . , PR) is always non-empty since the independent measure among the sub-vectors is
a feasible distribution. The set of joint distributions with fixed marginal distributions P(P1, . . . , PR)
is referred to as the Fre´chet class of distributions (see Ru¨schendorf [23]). It has been used to evaluate
bounds on the cumulative distribution function of a sum of random variables with an application in risk
management (Embrechts and Puccetti [13]). Doan and Natarajan [9] developed a robust optimization
model using P(P1, . . . , PR) with an application in project management. We now investigate this Fre´chet
class of distributions in the context of robust newsvendor games.
Given a subset S ⊆ N , we define Sr = S∩Nr for all r = 1, . . . , R. Clearly, if all retailers i, i ∈ S, join
together, we know the non-overlapping marginal distributions of the joint demand vector with respect
to the partition (S1, . . . ,SR) of S. If S ⊆ Nr for some r, the joint distribution of d˜i, i ∈ S, is completely
known. In this case, the action the coalition should take, i.e., the decision on the ordering quantity,
is well-defined as in the deterministic setting. The action set of coalition S can be simply defined as
Y(S) = {y∗(S)}, where y∗(S) is the (p − c)/p-quantile of the known distribution of d˜(S) as defined
in (3). Note that Y(S) acts as the action set A(S) in the general framework of robust cooperative
games. In general, the distribution P (S) is unknown and coalition S can choose its action regarding the
ordering quantity from a general action set Y(S). To keep it simple, we shall let Y(S) = R+ given the
fact that the ordering quantities are non-negative for all S ⊆ N . As mentioned earlier, if S ⊆ Nr for
some r, we can restrict Y(S) = {y∗(S)}, where y∗(S) is the (p− c)/p-quantile of the known distribution
of d˜(S) as defined in (3).
Given an ordering decision y ∈ Y(S), the uncertain payoff, i.e., total expected profit, of coalition S is
vP (y,S) = EP (S)
[
pmin{d˜(S), y} − cy
]
for P ∈ P(P1, . . . , PR) as in (2), where P (S) is the corresponding
marginal joint distribution of d˜i, i ∈ S, derived from P . For each individual retailer i, Y({i}) = y∗i and
vP (y
∗
i , {i}) ≥ vP (0, {i}) = 0 for all P ∈ P(P1, . . . , PR), which implies Assumption 1(i) is automatically
satisfied.
Finally, for the grand coalition, in order to satisfy Assumption 1(ii), we let
Y(N ) = {y ∈ R+ : vP (y,N ) > 0, ∀P ∈ P(P1, . . . , PR)} . (20)
We shall provide a simple condition with which the action set of the grand coalition is non-empty. Let
dmin(S) be the minimum value that the random demand d˜(S) can achieve, the following lemma sets out
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a sufficient condition for Y(N ) to be empty.
Lemma 3. If max
r=1,...,R
dmin(Nr) > 0, then Y(N ) 6= ∅.
Proof. We have: d˜(N ) =
R∑
r=1
d˜(Nr). Thus, if max
r=1,...,R
dmin(Nr) > 0, then:
dmin(N ) ≥
R∑
r=1
dmin(Nr) > 0.
For y ∈ [0, dmin(N)], vP (y,N ) = (p− c)y, which is strictly increasing for any P ∈ P(P1, . . . , PR) given
the fact that p > c. In addition, for y ≥ dmax(N ), vP (y,N ) = −cy+ p
R∑
r=1
EPr
[
d˜(Nr)
]
, which is strictly
decreasing for any P ∈ P(P1, . . . , PR) given the fact that c > 0.
Now consider the function v¯(y,N ) = min
P∈P(P1,...,PR)
vP (y,N ). It is clear that v¯(·,N ) is again strictly
increasing in [0, dmin(N )] and strictly decreasing in [dmax(N ),+∞). Thus we have:
arg max
y≥0
v¯(y,N ) ∈ [dmin(N ), dmax(N )],
and
max
y≥0
v¯(y,N ) ≥ v¯(dmin(N ),N ) = (p− c)dmin(N ) > 0.
Thus there exists y ≥ 0 such that v¯(y,N ) > 0, or equivalently, vP (y,N ) > 0 for all P ∈ P(P1, . . . , PR).
It shows that Y(N ) 6= ∅. 
The condition in Lemma 3 simply requires that one of the (marginal) distributions Pr, r = 1, . . . , R
has the support set of solely non-zero demand vectors, which can be considered as a reasonable as-
sumption in reality. In the rest of the paper, we shall make that assumption to ensure Y(N ) 6= ∅, or
equivalently, that Assumption 1(ii) is satisfied. We are now ready to consider the robust newsvendor
game (N ,Y,V(P(P1, . . . , Pr))) and investigate the existence of its imputations and core solutions.
4.1 Existence of Imputations and Core Solutions
The uncertain characteristic function vP (y,S) can be written as
vP (y,S) = (p− c)y − pEP (S)
[(
y − d˜(S)
)+]
, (21)
for all S ⊆ N , y ∈ Y(S), and P ∈ P(P1, . . . , PR). The deterministic newsvendor games always have
imputations since the corresponding characteristic function is super-additive. The following theorem
claims the existence of imputations of the robust newsvendor game (N ,Y,V(P(P1, . . . , Pr))).
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Theorem 3. The robust newsvendor game (N ,Y,V(P(P1, . . . , Pr))) always has an imputation.
In order to prove Theorem 3, we first study a particular action that each coalition can take, the
worst-case optimal ordering quantity y∗wc(S):
y∗wc(S) ∈ arg max
y≥0
{
(p− c)y − p max
P∈P(P1,...,PR)
EP
[(
y − d˜(S)
)+]}
. (22)
Basically, this ordering quantity is optimal under the worst-case scenario with respect to the joint
demand distribution P . Let us also define vwc(S) as the maximum worst-case expected profit for
coalition S, i.e.
vwc(S) = max
y≥0
{
(p− c)y − p max
P∈P(P1,...,PR)
EP
[(
y − d˜(S)
)+]}
. (23)
When S ⊆ Nr for some r, clearly, y∗wc(S) = y∗(S), the (p−c)/p-quantile of the known distribution of
d˜(S), and vwc(S) = v¯(S) as defined in (4). The following lemma shows how to calculate the worst-case
optimal ordering quantities y∗wc(S) and the worst-case expected profit vwc(S) for an arbitrary S ⊆ N .
Lemma 4. For an arbitrary S ⊆ N , the worst-case optimal ordering quantity y∗wc(S) defined in (22)
can be calculated as follows:
y∗wc(S) =
R∑
r=1
y∗(Sr), (24)
where Sr = S ∩ Nr for all r = 1, . . . , R, y∗(Sr) is the (p − c)/p-quantile of the known distribution of
d˜(Sr), and y∗(∅) = 0. In addition, vwc(S) =
R∑
r=1
vwc(Sr) =
R∑
r=1
v¯(Sr).
Proof. Consider the optimization problem in (22). For y ≤ dmin(S) = min{d˜(S)}, we can write
(p − c)y − pEP
[(
y − d˜(S)
)+]
= (p − c)y for any distribution P . Since p − c > 0, it is an increasing
function in y in (−∞; dmin(S)]. Since dmin(S) ≥ 0, we can then remove the non-negative constraint
y ≥ 0 from (22) when calculating y∗wc(S). Now, consider the inner optimization problem of (22). This
is an instance of the distributionally robust optimization problem studied in Doan and Natarajan [9].
Without loss of generality, we can assume that Sr 6= ∅ for all r = 1, . . . , R knowing that y∗(∅) = 0.
Applying Proposition 1(ii) from [9], we obtain the following reformulation:
max
P∈P(P1,...,PR)
EP
[(
y − d˜(S)
)+]
= min
x
R∑
r=1
EPr
[(
xr − d˜(Sr)
)+]
s.t.
R∑
r=1
xr = y.
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Thus, in order to find y∗wc(S), we can solve the following optimization problem
max
y,x
(p− c)y − p
R∑
r=1
EPr
[(
xr − d˜(Sr)
)+]
s.t.
R∑
r=1
xr = y.
The optimal ordering quantity y∗wc(S) can then be calculated as y∗wc(S) =
R∑
r=1
x∗r , where x∗ is the optimal
solution of the following separable optimization problem:
max
x
R∑
r=1
(
(p− c)xr − p
R∑
r=1
EPr
[(
xr − d˜(Sr)
)+])
,
or equivalently,
R∑
r=1
max
xr
(
(p− c)xr − pEPr
[(
xr − d˜(Sr)
)+])
.
For each sub-problem, x∗r is the (p− c)/p-quantile of the distribution of d˜(Sr), which means x∗r = y∗(Sr)
for all r = 1, . . . , R, according to (3). Thus we have y∗wc(S) =
R∑
r=1
y∗(Sr). This also leads to vwc(S) =
R∑
r=1
vwc(Sr) =
R∑
r=1
v¯(Sr). Here, the joint demand distribution for players in Sr is known and hence
the worst-case expected profit vwc(Sr) is exactly the same with the deterministic expected profit v¯(Sr)
shown in Formulation (4). 
We are now ready to use this lemma to prove Theorem 3.
Proof. According to Theorem 1, the robust newsvendor game (N ,Y,V(P(P1, . . . , Pr))) has imputa-
tions if and only if there exists y ∈ Y(N ) such that∑
i∈N
vmax(y, {i}) ≤ 1,
where vmax(y, {i}) = max
P∈P(P1,...,PR)

max
yi∈Y({i})
vP (yi, {i})
vP (y,N )
. For each individual retailer i, the demand
distribution is known; therefore Y({i}) = {y∗i }, where y∗i is the (p − c)/p-quantile of the distribution
function of d˜i. Thus
max
yi∈Y({i})
vP (yi, {i}) = vi(y∗) = v¯i ≥ 0, ∀P ∈ P(P1, . . . , PR).
We then have vmax(y, {i}) = v¯i ·
(
min
P∈P(P1,...,PR)
vP (y,N )
)−1
and the existence condition of imputation
can be written as follows:
∃ y ∈ Y(N ) :
∑
i∈N
v¯i ≤ min
P∈P(P1,...,PR)
vP (y,N ),
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given the fact that vP (y,N ) > 0 for all y ∈ Y(N ) and P ∈ P(P1, . . . , PR). Equivalently, the existence
condition is ∑
i∈N
v¯i ≤ max
y∈Y(N )
min
P∈P(P1,...,PR)
vP (y,N ) = max
y≥0
min
P∈P(P1,...,PR)
vP (y,N ).
The optimization problem max
y≥0
min
P∈P(P1,...,PR)
vP (y,N ) is the same as Problem (22). Let us consider the
worst-case optimal ordering quantity y∗wc(N ), the existence condition can then be written as follows:∑
i∈N
v¯i ≤ vP (y∗wc(N ),N ), ∀P ∈ P(P1, . . . , PR).
Applying Lemma 4 for S = N , we have y∗wc(N ) =
R∑
i=1
y∗(Nr). Using the fact that (x+ y)+ ≤ x+ + y+,
we have, for all P ∈ P(P1, . . . , PR),
vP (y
∗
wc(N ),N ) = (p− c)y∗wc(N )− pEP
[(
y∗wc(N )− d˜(N )
)+]
≥ (p− c)
R∑
i=1
y∗(Nr)− p
R∑
r=1
EPr
[(
y∗(Nr)− d˜(Nr)
)+]
=
R∑
r=1
{
(p− c)y∗(Nr)− pEPr
[(
y∗(Nr)− d˜(Nr)
)+]}
=
R∑
r=1
v¯(Nr),
where v¯(Nr) is the optimal total expected profit of coalition Nr and is computed using (4) for all
r = 1, . . . , R since P1, . . . , PR are completely known.
Now consider the deterministic newsvendor game for coalition Nr with the complete knowledge of
the joint distribution Pr. There exists at least one imputation for this cooperative game; thus, we have∑
i∈Nr
v¯i ≤ v¯(Nr), ∀ r = 1, . . . , R.
Using the fact that N = ⋃Rr=1Nr and Nr ∩Ns = ∅ for all r 6= s, we have
vP (N ) ≥
R∑
r=1
v¯(Nr) ≥
R∑
r=1
∑
i∈Nr
v¯i =
∑
i∈N
v¯i, ∀P ∈ P(P1, . . . , PR).
Thus, the existence condition is satisfied and the robust newsvendor game (N ,Y,V(P(P1, . . . , Pr)))
always has an imputation. 
We focus on properties of core solutions of the robust newsvendor game (N ,Y,V(P(P1, . . . , Pr)))
next.
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Theorem 4. If (y,z) is a core solution of the robust newsvendor game (N ,Y,V(P(P1, . . . , Pr))), then
the following statements hold:
(a) The ordering quantity y is the worst-case optimal ordering quantity, i.e., y = y∗wc(N ).
(b) vwc(N ) · z(Nr) is a core solution of the (deterministic) newsvendor game (Nr, v¯).
Proof. Let us consider a core solution (y,z) of the robust newsvendor game (N ,Y,V(P(P1, . . . , Pr))).
For each coalition Nr, r = 1, . . . , R, we have
vmax(y,Nr) = max
P∈P(P1,...,PR)

max
yr∈Y(Nr)
vP (yr,Nr)
vP (y,N )

=
max
yr∈Y(Nr)
vPr(yr,Nr)
min
P∈P(P1,...,PR)
vP (y,N )
=
vwc(Nr)
min
P∈P(P1,...,PR)
vP (y,N ) =
v¯(Nr)
min
P∈P(P1,...,PR)
vP (y,N ) . (25)
This is due to the fact that Pr is known with certainty and vwc(Nr) ≥ 0. According to Lemma 2 and
Equality (25), for (y,z) to be a core solution, we need to have∑
i∈Nr
zi ≥ vmax(y,Nr) = v¯(Nr)
min
P∈P(P1,...,PR)
vP (y,N ) . (26)
Summing this over r = 1, . . . , R, we obtain
1 =
∑
i∈N
zi =
R∑
r=1
∑
i∈Nr
zi ≥
R∑
r=1
v¯(Nr)
min
P∈P(P1,...,PR)
vP (y,N ) . (27)
Given Assumption 1(ii), min
P∈P(P1,...,PR)
vP (a,N ) > 0. Hence, we can rewrite Inequality (27) as
R∑
r=1
v¯(Nr) ≤ min
P∈P(P1,...,PR)
vP (y,N ).
This leads to
R∑
r=1
v¯(Nr) ≤ max
y≥0
min
P∈P(P1,...,PR)
vP (y,N ) (28)
≡ vwc(N )
=
R∑
r=1
vwc(Nr) =
R∑
r=1
v¯(Nr),
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where the last equality comes from Lemma 4. Thus, all the inequalities in the chain need to be tight.
It implies that the ordering quantity y is the worst-case optimal ordering quantity, y = y∗wc(N ) for (28)
to be tight. We also obtain
∑
i∈Nr
zi =
v¯(Nr)
vwc(N ) for (26) to be tight. In addition, for all coalition Sr ⊂ Nr,
by using the similar argument in deriving Equality (25), we have
∑
i∈Sr
zi ≥ vmax(y,Sr) = v¯(Sr)
vwc(N ) ,
which means vwc(N ) · z(Nr) is a core solution of the deterministic newsvendor game (Nr, v¯) for r =
1, . . . , R. 
Theorem 4 shows that in order to check whether a particular decision (y,z) is a core solution of
the robust newsvendor game (N ,Y,V(P(P1, . . . , Pr))), we only need to consider y = y∗wc(N ). The
optimization problem (19) for checking the existence of core solutions can be reduced to the following
linear program:
σ(y∗wc(N )) = minx, 
s.t.
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ vmax(y∗wc(N ),S)− , S ( N ,∑
i∈N
xi = 1.
(29)
Unlike the deterministic newsvendor games, the robust newsvendor games do not always have core
solution for N ≥ 3. The following example shows a simple robust newsvendor game with N = 3 whose
core is empty.
Example 1. Let us consider the partition of N = {1, 2, 3} with R = 2, N1 = {1, 2} and N3 = {3}.
The probability distribution P1 of (d˜1, d˜2) is characterized by the uniform marginal distribution of d˜1,
d˜1 ∼ U(0, D), for some D > 0, and the relationship d˜2 = D− d˜1. The probability distribution P2 of d˜3 is
another uniform distribution, d˜3 ∼ U(0, D). Clearly, Y(N ) 6= ∅ given the fact that dmin(N1) = D > 0.
According Theorem 4, if the robust newsvendor game (N ,Y,V(P(P1, P2))) has a core solution (y,z),
then y = y∗wc(N ). Given P1 and P2, we are able to compute and bound some values of vmax(y,S) where
S ⊂ N , as follows:
vmax(y, {1, 2}) = 2p
3p− c ≤ vmax(y, {2, 3}) = vmax(y, {1, 3}).
For clarity of the exposition, we leave the detailed computation of these values in the Appendix. Now,
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since (y,z) is a core solution,
∑
i∈S
zi ≥ vmax(y,S) for S ⊂ N and z1 + z2 + z3 = 1. Thus
2 = (z1 + z2) + (z2 + z3) + (z3 + z1)
≥ vmax(y, {1, 2}) + vmax(y, {2, 3}) + vmax(y, {1, 3})
≥ 6p/(3p− c) > 2,
which is a contradiction or this robust newsvendor game does not have a core solution.
We now focus on how to solve Problem (29) to check the existence of core solutions of robust newsven-
dor games. If the core is empty, i.e., σ(y∗wc(N )) > 0, least core solutions for the robust newsvendor
game can be found by solving the general problem (19), which will be discussed in the next section.
4.2 Core and Least Core Computation
Both Problems (19) and (29) involve the function vmax. We first show how to compute vmax(y,S) for an
arbitrary ordering quantity y ∈ Y(N ) and an arbitrary S ( N with Y(S) = R+. (Note that if S ⊆ Nr
for some r, r = 1, . . . , R, we then have Y(S) = {y∗(S)} and vmax(y,S) can be computed by simply
solving a single optimization problem, min
P∈P(P1,...,PR)
vP (y,N ).) We have:
vmax(y,S) = max
γ∈R+
max
P∈P(P1,...,PR)
(p− c)γ − pEP
[(
γ − d˜(S)
)+]
(p− c)y − pEP
[(
y − d˜(N )
)+] . (30)
For newsvendor games, it is reasonable to assume that demands follow discrete non-negative distribu-
tions, which could be constructed from historical sales or market analysis. More specifically, let each
distribution Pr of d˜r be represented as a discrete non-negative distribution with Kr values, d
k
r of prob-
ability pkr , for k = 1, . . . ,Kr, r = 1, . . . , R. Thus, each probability distribution P in P(P1, . . . , PR) is a
discrete distribution with a support of K =
R∏
r=1
Kr values dk and each has an unknown probability of
qk, k = 1, . . . ,K. For P to be consistent with P1, . . . , PR, the following constraints on q must hold:{
q ≥ 0,
K∑
k=1
qk = 1,
K∑
k=1
I{dk,r = dlr}qk = plr, r = 1, . . . , R, l = 1, . . . ,Kr
}
. (31)
Given the one-to-one mapping between P and q, we abuse the notations and write both vP (y,S) and
vq(y,S) interchangeably when the context is clear for q to be the corresponding representation of P .
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Problem (30) can be reformulated as
vmax(y,S) = max
γ,q
(p− c)γ − p ∑Kk=1 [(γ − dk(S))+] qk
(p− c)y − p∑Kk=1 [(y − dk(N ))+] qk
s.t.
K∑
k=1
I{dk,r = dlr}qk = plr, ∀ r = 1, . . . , R, l = 1, . . . ,Kr,
K∑
k=1
qk = 1,
γ, q ≥ 0.
(32)
For each fixed γ, we can apply the standard method for transforming a linear fractional optimization
problem into a linear program (see, for example, Cambini et al. [5]). To this end, let us introduce new
decision variables
θ =
1
(p− c)y − p∑Kk=1 [(y − dk(N ))+] qk ,
and
ψk =
qk
(p− c)y − p∑Kk=1 [(y − dk(N ))+] qk , k = 1, . . . ,K.
Under Assumption 1(ii), we have θ > 0. The objective function then becomes
(p− c)γ · θ − p
K∑
k=1
[
(γ − dk(S))+
]
ψk,
and Problem (32) can be reformulated as
vmax(y,S) = max
γ,θ,ψ
(p− c)γ · θ − p
K∑
k=1
[
(γ − dk(S))+
]
ψk
s.t.
K∑
k=1
I{dk,r = dlr}ψk − plr · θ = 0, ∀ r = 1, . . . , R, l = 1, . . . ,Kr,
K∑
k=1
ψk − θ = 0,
(p− c)y · θ − p
K∑
k=1
[
(y − dk(N ))+
]
ψk = 1,
γ, θ,ψ ≥ 0,
(33)
where the first two constraints in (33) are derived directly from the first two constraints in (32) by
multiplying both sides of those with θ. The third constraint in (33) is derived by the definitions of θ
and ψ. Finally, we have replaced the constraint θ > 0 by θ ≥ 0 without loss of generality since θ = 0 is
not a feasible solution (otherwise, ψ must be equal to zero from the second constraint and that violates
the third constraint.)
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Problem (33) is a bilinear optimization problem, which is generally not easy to solve. We show,
however, in the following proposition that one of the distinct values of {d1(S), . . . , dK(S)}, which are
known, is an optimal value of γ. Given a fixed γ, the resulting bilinear optimization problem is reduced
to a linear program. It implies that we can solve Problem (33) by solving at most K linear programs
with γ set to each and every distinct value of {d1(S), . . . , dK(S)}.
Proposition 1. There exists an optimal solution (γ∗, θ∗,ψ∗) of Problem (33) such that
γ∗ ∈ {d1(S), . . . , dK(S)}.
Proof. Given an arbitrary value of γ, Problem (33) is reduced to a linear program for θ and ψ
over a fixed feasible set F defined by the set of constraints in (33), i.e., γ only affects the objective
function. Under Assumption 1(ii), θ and ψ are non-negative and bounded, which means F is bounded
and Problem (33) can be written as follows:
vmax(y,S) = max
γ≥0
(
max
s=1,...,S
{
(p− c)γ · θs − p
K∑
k=1
[
(γ − dk(S))+
]
ψsk
})
,
where {(θs,ψs)}s=1,...,S is the set of extreme points of F . Equivalently, we have:
vmax(y,S) = max
s=1,...,S
{
max
γ≥0
(
(p− c)γ · θs − p
K∑
k=1
[
(γ − dk(S))+
]
ψsk
)}
.
For an arbitrary solution (θs,ψs), s = 1, . . . , S, it is easy to show that function f(γ; θs,ψs) =
(p− c)γ · θs− p
K∑
k=1
[
(γ − dk(S))+
]
ψsk is a concave piece-wise linear function with intersection points as
distinct values of the set {d1(S), . . . , dK(S)}. Since θs > 0 as shown previously, f(·; θs,ψs) tends to −∞
when γ tends to +∞. It means there is at least an optimal solution for the problem max
γ≥0
f(γ; θs,ψs)
which belongs to the set {d1(S), . . . , dK(S)}. Thus we have:
vmax(y,S) = max
s=1,...,S
{
max
l=1,...,K
{
(p− c)dl(S) · θs − p
K∑
k=1
[
(dl(S)− dk(S))+
]
ψsk
}}
,
which shows that there exists an optimal solution (γ∗, θ∗,ψ∗) of Problem (33) such that
γ∗ ∈ {d1(S), . . . , dK(S)}.

Proposition 1 shows us how to compute vmax(y,S) by solving at most K linear programs. We can
use this approach to compute vmax(y
∗
wc(N ),S) as inputs of the linear program (29), which is then solved
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to check the existence of core solutions of the robust newsvendor game (N ,Y,V(P(P1, . . . , Pr))). If the
core is empty, we need to consider the general problem (19) applying to the robust newsvendor game,
whose optimal solutions can be considered as its least core solutions. Let us consider the following
problem, which is similar to (29), for an arbitrary y ∈ Y(N ):
σ(y) = min
x,

s.t.
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ vmax(y,S)− , S ( N ,∑
i∈N
xi = 1.
(34)
Clearly, s(N ,Y,V(P(P1, . . . , Pr))) = min
y∈Y(N )
σ(y), which is a reformulation of the least core problem
(19). We will show that σ(y) is a convex function in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The following statements hold:
(a) For each coalition S ( N , vmax(y,S) is a convex function of y on Y(N ).
(b) σ(y) is a convex function of y on Y(N ).
In order to prove the proposition, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 5. The inverse function
1
vP (y,N ) is a convex function of y on Y(N ) for all P ∈ P(P1, . . . , PR).
Proof. Let q be the corresponding probability vector of a joint distribution P ∈ P(P1, . . . , PR). We
have:
vP (y,N ) ≡ vq(y,N ) = (p− c)y − p
K∑
k=1
[
(y − dk(N ))+
]
qk,
which is a piecewise linear concave function of y with at most (K + 1) linear pieces positioning within
the intervals induced by the sorted sequence of {d1(N ), d2(N ) . . . dK(N )}. We can therefore rewrite
vP (y,N ) = min
k=1,...,K+1
{aky+bk} where ak, bk are appropriate linear coefficients that can be derived from
p, c, d(N ) and q. Since vP (y,N ) > 0 for all y ∈ Y(N ), we have: aky + bk > 0 for all k = 1, . . . ,K + 1,
and y ∈ Y(N ). We then have:
1
vP (y,N ) = maxk=1,...,K+1
1
aky + bk
,
which is the maximum of convex inverse linear functions on Y(N ) and hence is also a convex function
in Y(N ). 
We are now ready to prove the Proposition 2.
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Proof. (a) If S ⊆ Nr for some r, r = 1, . . . , R, we have: Y(S) = {y∗(S)} and
vmax(y,S) = max
P∈P(P1,...,PR)
v¯(S)
(p− c)y − pEP
[(
y − d˜(N )
)+]
=
v¯(S)
minq∈Q
{
(p− c)y − p∑Kk=1 [(y − dk(N ))+] qk} ≡
v¯(S)
minq∈Q vq(y,N ) ,
where Q = Q(P1, . . . , PR) is the feasible set of the probability vector q as described in (31). The second
equality follows from the fact that v¯(S) ≥ 0 and vP (y,N ) > 0. Since Q is a bounded polytope; there
exists an optimal solution q∗ ∈ Q∗, where Q∗ is the set of extreme points of Q. Thus we have:
vmax(y,S) = max
q∈Q∗
v¯(S)
vq(y,N ) .
Since v¯(S) ≥ 0 and since 1
vq(y,N ) is convex for each q according to Lemma 5, we have: vmax(y,S) is
convex.
Now consider an arbitrary S ( N with Y(S) = R+. We have,
vmax(y,S) = max
P∈P(P1,...,PR)
max
γ∈Y(S)
vP (γ,S)
vP (y,N ) .
We have: vP (y,N ) > 0 for all P ∈ P(P1, . . . , PR) and y ∈ Y(N ). In addition, Y(S) = R+, thus there
always exists γ ∈ Y(S) small enough such that vP (γ,S) ≥ 0 for any P . We then have: vmax(y,S) ≥ 0
for all y ∈ Y(N ). We can rewrite the formulation of vmax(y,S) as follows:
vmax(y,S) = max
γ∈R+
max
q∈Q
(p− c)γ − p∑Kk=1 [(γ − dk(S))+] qk
(p− c)y − p∑Kk=1 [(y − dk(N ))+] qk .
Proposition 1 shows that we can restrict the domain of γ to the discrete set {d1(S), . . . , dK(S)},
that is,
vmax(y,S) = max
γ∈{d1(S),...,dK(S)}
max
q∈Q
(p− c)γ − p∑Kk=1 [(γ − dk(S))+] qk
(p− c)y − p∑Kk=1 [(y − dk(N ))+] qk .
For a fixed γ, the inner problem is a linear fractional optimization problem over the bounded polyhedron
Q and hence there exists an optimal solution q∗ given that vP (y,N ) > 0 for all y ∈ Y(N ) and
P ∈ P(P1, . . . , PR). Let us consider the level sets Lα of the linear fractional objective function, which
are hyperplanes. For the optimal objective value α∗, we have: Lα∗∩Q 6= ∅. We claim that Lα∗∩Q∗ 6= ∅,
where Q∗ is the set of extreme points of Q. Since α∗ is the optimal objective value, Q belongs to a
half-space defined by Lα∗ . Suppose, on contradiction, that Lα∗ ∩ Q∗ = ∅. Due to convexity and since
the entire Q∗ belongs to the same half-space defined by Lα∗ , we have: Lα∗ ∩Q = ∅ (contradiction).
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With Lα∗ ∩Q∗ 6= ∅, we can now compute vmax(y,S) as follows:
vmax(y,S) = max
γ∈{d1(S),...,dK(S)}
max
q∈Q∗
(p− c)γ − p∑Kk=1 [(γ − dk(S))+] qk
(p− c)y − p∑Kk=1 [(y − dk(N ))+] qk .
Since vmax(y,S) ≥ 0, we can focus on the set H ∈ {d1(S), . . . , dK(S)} × Q∗ of (γ, q) such that (p −
c)γ − p∑Kk=1 [(γ − dk(S))+] qk ≥ 0 when computing vmax(y,S), that is,
vmax(y,S) = max
(γ,q)∈H
(p− c)γ − p∑Kk=1 [(γ − dk(S))+] qk
(p− c)y − p∑Kk=1 [(y − dk(N ))+] qk .
Applying Lemma (5), clearly, vmax(y,S) is the maximum of convex functions, which means it is also a
convex function.
(b) To prove the convexity of σ(y), we show that, for any {y1, y2, y3} ∈ Y(N ) such that there exists
α ∈ [0, 1] with y2 = αy1 + (1− α)y3, then σ(y2) ≤ ασ(y1) + (1− α)σ(y3).
Let (x1, 1) and (x3, 3) be the optimal solutions of (34) when y = y1 and y = y3, respectively. Let
us define (x2, 2) = α(x1, 1) + (1 − α)(x3, 3). It is easy to verify that eTx2 = 1. In addition, for all
S ( N , we have
x2(S) + 2 = α(x1(S) + 1) + (1− α)(x3(S) + 3) (35)
≥ αvmax(y1,S) + (1− α)vmax(y3,S) (36)
≥ vmax(αy1 + (1− α)y3,S) (37)
= vmax(y2,S), (38)
where (35) comes directly from the construction of (x2, 2); (36) comes from the feasibility of (x1, 1)
and (x3, 3); (37) comes from the convexity of vmax(y,S) as shown in part (a). Finally, (38) comes
directly from the definition of y2.
This shows that (x2, 2) is a feasible solution of (34) when y = y2. Therefore,
σ(y2) ≤ 2 = α1 + (1− α)3 = ασ(y1) + (1− α)σ(y3),
i.e., σ(y) is a convex function. 
Proposition 2 shows that the least core problem (19) for our robust newsvendor game is a convex
optimization problem in terms of y and we could apply simple one-dimensional search algorithms to
find the optimal solution. The next section provides some numerical results on the properties and
computation of the core (and least core) solutions of robust newsvendor games.
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4.3 Numerical Results
We consider the following experimental setting. We are given a set of retailers N and a partition
N1, . . . ,NR. In addition, for each r = 1, . . . , R, we are given the discrete historical joint demand
distribution Pr for the subset of retailers Nr but not the joint demand distribution of all retailers.
Discussions in Section 4.2 allow us to compute a robust core (or least core) solution by solving (29) (and
(19) if necessary) under the framework of robust newsvendor games, which consists of the allocation
scheme zrob and an order quantity yrob for the grand coalition.
In order to evaluate the performance of the robust solution (yrob, zrob), we are going to compare
it with the solution derived from the deterministic newsvendor game under the assumption that all
multivariate marginal distributions Pr, r = 1, . . . , R, are independent of each other, that is, P(d˜ =
(dl11 , . . . ,d
lR
r )) =
R∏
r=1
P(d˜r = dlrr ) =
R∏
r=1
plrr . This could be considered as a common assumption on the
joint distribution given its marginal distributions. Clearly, the resulting joint distribution PI belongs
to P(P1, . . . , PR). Given this distribution PI , we can compute the allocation scheme zdet = x/v¯(N ),
where x is a core solution of the deterministic newsvendor game with respect to PI . In addition, the
optimal order quantity ydet for the grand coalition in this deterministic newsvendor game is used to
form the solution (ydet, zdet), which will be compared with the robust solution (yrob, zrob).
We shall compare the performance of these two solutions with respect to joint distributions which
belong to P(P1, . . . , PR). Given a distribution P ∈ P(P1, . . . , PR), we compute the maximum normalized
dissatisfaction or worst normalized excess value for each solution. For (yrob, zrob), the excess value is
computed as
Prob = maxS(N

 maxγ∈Y(S) vP (γ,S)
vP (yrob,N ) − zrob(S)
+
 . (39)
The excess value Pdet can be defined in the same fashion for (ydet, zdet). We follow the stress test
approach proposed by Dupacˇova´ [11] with the contaminated distributions Pλ = λPI + (1 − λ)Pext for
λ ∈ [0, 1], where Pext are extremal distributions, i.e., those distributions which are likely to be the ones
with which vmax(y,S) are computed. Similar approach has been discussed in Bertsimas et al. [3] to test
the quality of some stochastic optimization solutions.
We now consider a numerical example with n = 10 and R = 2, with the sizes of subsets, |N1| = 4 and
|N2| = 6, respectively. We construct multivariate marginal distributions P1 and P2 from a randomly
generated discrete joint distribution with the support set of each individual retailer’s demand set to
[1, 10]. Other parameters include p = 1.5 and c = 1. All the numerical results are tested on a PC with
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2.67 gigahertz CPU, 12 gigabyte RAM, and a 64-bit Windows 7 operating system. We use MATLAB
8.0 for coding and IBM CPLEX Studio Academic version 12.5 for solving LPs problems under default
settings. In order to compute a robust core (or least core) solution of this game, we would need to
compute vmax(y,S) for each of 2n = 1024 coalitions. This is accomplished by solving a number of linear
programs as presented in Proposition 1. On average, the total time it took to compute a single value
vmax(y,S) is approximately 12 seconds under this setting. Problem (29) can then be directly solved
whereas (19) is solved with a simple one-dimensional search algorithm whose main subroutine depends
on the solution of (29) for different values of y.
In this numerical example, for a given value of λ, we simply generate 100 random extremal dis-
tributions Pext by solving the linear program {max cTq : q ∈ Q} with random cost vectors c. We
also include extremal distributions produced while calculating vmax. The excess values 
P
rob and 
P
det are
computed for all contaminated distributions Pλ. Figure 1 provides comparisons on three statistics of 
P
rob
and Pdet for each fixed value of λ: the maximum, the minimum, and the average. The maximum values
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Figure 1: Comparison between Prob and 
P
det for contaminated distributions with different λ.
of both Prob and 
P
det increase when λ increases. For λ > 0.5, the robust solution (yrob, zrob) yields smaller
excess values in the worst case as compared to those of (ydet, zdet) for contaminated distributions. It
shows that the robust solution hedges against the worst case as expected even though on average, the
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solution (ydet, zdet) is slightly better in terms of worst excess values. It is worth noting that in the best
case, both solutions are core solutions with no dissatisfaction even for the case of λ = 1.
We run the experiment again for M = 20 different instances. Figure 2 shows the statistics of Prob and
Pdet when λ = 1 for all of these instances. The results again show that the robust solution (yrob, zrob)
consistently outperforms (ydet, zdet) for all these instances in the worst case and is slightly worse on
average. Finally, we run the experiment again for four different settings with respect to sizes of the
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
Instance
W
o
r s
t  
e
x
c
e
s
s
 v
a
l u
e
 
 
Maximum ε
rob
P
Maximum  ε
det
P
Average  ε
rob
P
Average  ε
det
P
Minimum  ε
rob
P
Minimum  ε
det
P
Figure 2: Comparison between Prob and 
P
det for different instances with λ = 1.
two subsets, (1, 9), (2, 8), (3, 7), and (5, 5), in addition to the original setting of (4, 6), with M = 20
instances for each setting. Figure 3 shows the box plots for the maximum values of Prob and 
P
det when
λ = 1. The results again show that the robust solution (yrob, zrob) outperforms (ydet, zdet) in the worst
case.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a framework for newsvendor games with ambiguity in demand distributions,
which we call robust cooperative games. We discuss solution concepts of robust cooperative games and
study them in the context of newsvendor games with ambiguity in demand distributions when only
marginal distributions are known. Some numerical results are provided, which show the robust core
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solutions hedge against the worst cases as expected. It is possible to develop other frameworks for
cooperative games with uncertain characteristic functions by using different payoff distribution schemes
and preference relations, which could be applied to other applications.
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Appendix: Derivation for Example 1
Let us consider the robust newsvendor game introduced in Example 1. According to Lemma 4, the
worst-case optimal ordering quantity y∗wc(N ) is computed as follows:
y∗wc(N ) = y∗({1, 2}) + y∗({3}) = D +
D(p− c)
p
=
D(2p− c)
p
.
Similarly,
vwc(N ) = v¯({1, 2}) + v¯({3}) = D(p− c) + D(p− c)
2
2p
=
D(p− c)(3p− c)
2p
.
Given P ∈ P(P1, P2), we have:
vP (y
∗
wc(N ),N ) = (p− c)(y∗({1, 2}) + y∗({3}))− pEP (y∗({1, 2}) + y∗({3})−D − d˜3)+
= (p− c)D + (p− c)y∗({3})− pEP2(y∗({3})− d˜3))+
= v¯({1, 2}) + v¯({3})
= vwc(N ).
Thus we have:
vmax(y
∗
wc(N ),S) = max
P∈P(P1,P2)
max
y∈Y(S)
vP (y,S)
vP (y∗wc(N ),N )
= max
P∈P(P1,P2)
max
y∈Y(S)
vP (y,S)
vwc(N ) .
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Combining with (25), we can compute vmax(y
∗
wc(N ), {1, 2}) as follows:
vmax(y
∗
wc(N ), {1, 2}) =
v¯({1, 2})
vwc(N)
=
2p
3p− c .
Now consider the sub-coalition {1, 3}. Let P be the distribution characterized by the marginal distri-
bution of d˜1 and the relationship d˜2 = d˜3 = D − d˜1. Clearly, P ∈ P(P1, P2). In addition, let y = D,
which is a feasible ordering quantity, we have:
vmax(y
∗
wc(N ), {1, 3}) ≥
vP (y, {1, 3})
vwc(N )
=
D(p− c)− pEP (D −D)+
vwc(N )
=
2p
3p− c .
Given the symmetry between d˜1 and d˜2, we can show that vmax(y
∗
wc(N ), {2, 3}) = vmax(y∗wc(N ), {1, 3}).
Thus, we obtain the required inequalities,
vmax(y
∗
wc(N ), {1, 2}) =
2p
3p− c ≤ vmax(y
∗
wc(N ), {2, 3}) = vmax(y∗wc(N ), {1, 3}),
for Example 1.
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